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TORT LAW-THE LOCALITY RULE IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE LITI
GATION: AN INAPPROPRIATE METHOD OF DEFINING THE REQUIRED
STANDARD OF

CARE-Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 510 A.2d 436

(1986).
INTRODUCTION

"Lawyers who handle personal injury cases, work in firms of five
or fewer[,] ... and have at least [ten] years experience are among the
most likely targets for malpractice claims."! The majority of these
malpractice claims allege attorney negligence. 2 To recover for their
negligence claims, clients must prove more than just a bad result.
They must be able to prove that the attorney's performance did not
meet the appropriate standard of care, which requires reasonable con
duct under the circumstances, and that the attorney's failure to meet
the standard of care caused their injury.3 The standard of care refers
to a set of criteria used by the trier of fact to determine the adequacy
of the attorney's conduct.4 One aspect of the standard of care formu
lation on which many courts disagree is what, if any, geographic limi
tation should be used to determine the appropriate standard. 5
1. Marcotte, Suing Lawyers: Malpractice Targets Profiled, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1986, at
25 (citing findings of American Bar Association's committee on lawyers' professional
responsibility).
2. Gates, Lawyer's Malpractice: Some Recent Data About a Growing Problem, 37
MERCER L. REV. 559, 562 (1986) (Analysis of alleged attorney errors indicates that 70.1 %
of all claims were for negligence arising from either administrative or substantive errors.
The remaining claims arose out of client relations or intentional wrongs.).
3. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 100 (2d ed. 1981).
4. Id. at §§ 250-51. Criteria important to this determination are "the requisite skill
and knowledge; the degree of skill and knowledge to be possessed and exercised; the effect
of local considerations and customs; and any special abilities possessed by the lawyer." Id.
at §§ 251-52. Examples of standard of care formulations are as follows: "at least that de
gree of care, skill and diligence which is exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in his
locality," Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 786, 269 So. 2d 239, 244
(1972); .. 'that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exer
cised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this jurisdic
tion'.... " Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986) (quoting Cook,
Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968».
5. In formulating a standard of care for legal malpractice litigation, courts have not
agreed on one geographic area which is appropriate for measuring acceptable legal practice.
The geographic areas chosen range from a local community to the entire nation. See. e.g.,
Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 809, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1975) (standard
based upon same or similar locality); Kellos v. Sawilowsky, 254 Ga. 4, 5, 325 S.E.2d 757,
395
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This note examines the appropriateness of using a geographic lim
itation to define the standard of care in legal malpractice litigation.
First, this note discusses the Vermont Supreme Court's decision in
Russo v. Griffin,6 where the court adopted a state wide standard of
care7 overruling its prior decisions applying a locality standard. 8 This
section includes an analysis of the rationale used by the Vermont court
and other courts to overturn the locality rule. The analysis includes
discussion of (1) the locality standard, (2) the state standard, (3) a
national standard based upon the legal profession generally, and (4) a
national standard for the legal specialist. Second, the note analyzes the
evolution of the standard of care in medical malpractice litigation
from a locality standard to a general profession standard. The medical
standard evolution is important in formulating the legal malpractice
standard because many courts draw an analogy between medical and
legal malpractice. 9 Finally, the note proposes a model standard of
care which is devoid of any geographic limitation yet includes the cri
teria important in determining the acceptability of an attorney's
conduct.

758 (1985) (standard based on legal profession generally with no reference to a particular
locality); Ramp, 263 La. at 786, 269 So. 2d at 244 (standard based on attorney's locality);
Russo, 147 Vt. at 24,510 A.2d at 438 (standard based on attorney conduct throughout the
state).
6. 147 Vt. 20, 510 A.2d 436 (1986).
7. Id. at 24, 510 A.2d at 438.
8. Hughes v. Klien, 139 Vt. 232, 233,427 A.2d 353, 354 (1981) ("The standard for
legal services, as in other professions, is the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge
which normally prevails at the time and place."); In re Cronin, 133 Vt. 234, 240, 336 A.2d
164, 168 (1975) ("The standard of adequacy of legal services as in other professions is the
exercise of customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place.")
(quoting Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3rd Cir. 1970».
9. See, e.g., Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 853, 227 S.E.2d 802, 806 (1976)
(Georgia requires expert testimony in both legal and medical malpractice to determine
whether the defendant's conduct is negligent); Dean v. Conn, 419 So. 2d 148, 149 (Miss.
1982) ("Generally the same standards of professional conduct are applicable to the attor
ney and physician alike...."); McCullogh v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381, 384, 132 A. 102, 103
(1926) (duty between an attorney and client is the same as between doctor and patient);
Russo, 147 Vt. at 23, 510 A.2d at 438 (reasoning of courts rejecting the locality rule in
medical malpractice litigation is applicable to legal malpractice).
The analogy between medical and legal malpractice may not be as conceptually sound
as these courts have assumed. There are many differences between the medical and legal
professions which could be explored to discredit the court's use of the analogy. With this
limitation in mind, this note seeks only to explore how the analogy has been used to justify
changes in the standard of care in legal malpractice litigation, and not whether the analogy
is appropriate.
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Russo V. GRIFFIN

The Facts and Procedural History

Russo arose when attorney Griffin's client, J. A. Russo Paving,
Inc., filed suit alleging Griffin's negligence in failing to inform the cor
poration of the desirability of a non-competition agreement during a
corporate buy out. to J. A. Russo Paving, Inc. was a family held pav
ing business in Rutland, Vermont. Joseph Russo incorporated the
business in 1975 to transfer his interest to his sons, Anthony and
Frank. 11 Griffin arranged the incorporation, and subsequently all an
nual meetings were held in his office. 12
The buyout arrangement occurred when Frank Russo wished to
sell his interest in the corporation to finance the purchase of a local
laundromat. 13 Griffin arranged a transfer of Frank's stock to the cor
poration. The transfer was secured by a $6000 promissory note from
the corporation which was personally guaranteed by Anthony Russo
and his wife. 14
The Vermont Supreme Court summarized Griffin's alleged mis
conduct in the stock transfer as follows:
At no time during the meeting did ... Griffin inform the corpora
tion or Tony Russo, the sole remaining shareholder, of the desirabil
ity of obtaining a covenant not to compete or explain the
implications thereof. Three months after the stock transfer, Frank
went back into the paving business in Rutland in direct competition
with the plaintiff corporation. A properly drafted non-competition
covenant would have prevented this from occurring. IS

During trial, the plaintiff produced two practicing attorneys from
the Burlington, Vermont area as expert witnesses. They testified that
"Griffin's failure to exact a covenant not to compete deviated from the
standard of care required of attorneys practicing in Vermont at the
time."16 Griffin produced two attorneys from Rutland who testified
that his failure to recommend a non-competition covenant in the buy
out of a family member in a closely held business did not deviate from
the standard of care for Rutland area attorneys.17 The trial court,
10. Russo, 147 Vt. at 22, 510 A.2d at 437.
11. Id. at 21,510 A.2d at 436.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 21, 510 A.2d at 437.
15. Id. at 22, 510 A.2d at 437.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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having to choose between conflicting expert testimony regarding the
propriety of Griffin's conduct, relied on Vermont's locality rule 18 and
held that Griffin did not breach the standard of care for Rutland attor
neys and therefore was not negligent. 19 The plaintiff-corporation ap
pealed the verdict, challenging the trial court's application of the
locality rule as part of the required standard of care.
B.

The Locality Rule

The Vermont Supreme Court in Russo faced a challenge to the
continued validity of a standard of care defined by the locality of the
attorney's practice. 20 The Vermont court adopted the locality rule in
In re Cronin,21 which involved a prisoner's claim for post conviction
relief. 22 In Cronin the trial court held that the standard for determin
ing whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel was
whether the attorney's conduct amounted to a "mockery of justice."23
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court held that" '[t]he standard of
legal services as in other professions is the exercise of the customary
skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and
place.' "24
The Vermont Supreme Court later applied the locality rule to a
legal malpractice action in Hughes v. Klien. 25 In Hughes, the plaintiff
filed a small claim action against her attorney for advice allowing the
release of a spouse's bank records during divorce proceedings. The
plaintiff claimed that the subsequent cost to photocopy the records
was unnecessary.26 The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that the attorney's advice was consistent with com
munity standards, citing Cronin as authority on the appropriate stan
18. See supra note 8.
19. Russo, 147 Vt. at 22, 510 A.2d at 437.
20. Id.
21. 133 Vt. 234, 336 A.2d 164 (1975).
22. Id. at 235, 336 A.2d at 165. The appellant Cronin claimed that his plea of nolo
contendere was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court ap
plied an improper standard in determining the acceptability of his attorney's conduct. Id.
at 235, 336 A.2d at 166-67.
23. Id. at 238, 336 A.2d at 167 (citing State v. Rushford, 127 Vt. 105, 241 A.2d 306
(1968); In re Murphy, 125 Vt. 272, 214 A.2d 317 (1965)).
24. Cronin, 133 Vt. at 240, 336 A.2d at 168 (quoting Moore v. U.S., 432 F.2d 730,
736 (3d Cir. 1970)). As in Cronin, the issue in Moore was the determination of what consti
tutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Moore, 432 F.2d at 732. In adopting the standard for
legal services, Moore cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A. Id. at 736 n.24.
25. 139 Vt. 232, 427 A.2d 353 (1981).
26. Id. at 233, 427 A.2d at 353-54.
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dard of care formulation. 27
In overturning Vermont's locality rule, the court in Russo noted
that the rule developed in the late nineteenth century, in the context of
medical malpractice litigation, to compensate for the disparity be
tween medical practitioners in rural and urban areas. 28 "'The rule
was unquestionably developed to protect the rural and small town
practitioner, who was presumed to be less adequately informed and
equipped than his big city brother.' "29 Subsequently, courts applied
the locality rule to legal malpractice litigation, holding that an attor
ney is required to possess only the skill and diligence ordinarily pos
sessed by other attorneys in the locality. 3D
Inclusion of the attorney's locality as a factor in the standard of
care formulation means the attorney's performance is compared solely
against other attorneys practicing in that locality.31 This comparison
results because a locality based standard is commonly phrased as the
degree of care, skill, diligence, and knowledge possessed and exercised
by reasonable attorneys "at the time and place,"32 or "in that local
ity."33 Courts which apply a locality standard limit the application of
the competency criteria to attorneys practicing in a certain geographic
area because they presume that an attorney's conduct is dictated by
local rules, customs, or practices. 34
27.

Id. at 233, 427 A.2d at 354.
Russo, 147 Vt. at 23, 510 A.2d at 437. For a discussion of the standard of care in
medical malpractice litigation, see infra text accompanying notes 98-117.
29. Id. (quoting Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 193,
349 A.2d 245, 248 (1975)).
30. Patterson & Wallace v. Frazier, 79 S.W. 1077, 1080 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) (" 'An
attorney is expected and required to possess such reasonable skill and diligence in all ques
tions relating to his profession as are recognized by the profession where he practices
law.' ") (quoting Annotation, Liability ofAttorney to Client for Mistake, 1901 L.R.A. 883,
893).
31. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
32. Hughes v. Klien, 139 Vt. 232, 233, 427 A.2d 353,354 (1981); In re Cronin, 133
Vt. 234, 240, 336 A.2d 164, 168 (1975).
33. Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 786, 269 So. 2d 239, 244
(1972) ("in his locality"); Dean v. Conn, 419 So. 2d 148, 149 (Miss. 1982) ("in that
locality").
34. Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). Holding that expert
testimony of an attorney from another county was not competent, the court stated:
[A]n attorney practicing in a vastly different locality would not be qualified to
second-guess the judgment of an experienced attorney of the El Paso County Bar
as to who should be joined as additional party defendants.... The importance of
knowledge of the local situation is fully demonstrated by the well-recognized
practice among lawyers of this state in associating local counsel in the trial of
most important jury cases.
Id.
28.
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An effect of applying a locality based standard is that available
expert testimony necessary to establish attorney negligence will be lim
ited. 35 Expert testimony from other attorneys is essential to the plain
tiff's case because only an attorney is competent to testify whether the
defendant-attorney's conduct met the required standard of care. 36
Limiting available expert testimony to that from local attorneys allows
a locality to set its own standard of care because only local attorneys
may testify as to what is acceptable legal conduct. In Russo, the trial
court's reluctance to accept the expert testimony of the Burlington at
torneys on the appropriate standard of care effectively allowed the
Rutland attorneys to dictate what was proper conduct in their com
munity at the time because their testimony was, in effect, uncontra
dicted. Limiting outside expert testimony also promotes a conspiracy
of silence because local attorneys are reluctant to testify against each
other,37 especially in a small community.38
While some commentators have justified the use of a locality
based standard when the attorney's alleged negligence involves the ap
plication of local rules, customs, or practices,39 its application cannot
be justified when the negligence involves general principles of law. 40
Several jurisdictions, however, including Vermont until Russo, adhere
to the locality rule41 even though its application may not be justified
35. In Russo the Vermont Supreme Court noted the effect of the locality rule on
expert testimony:
[T]he trial court erroneously applied the locality rule in defining the applicable
standard of care. This ruling clearly prejudiced the plaintiffs as the court chose to
accept the testimony of defendants', rather than plaintiff's, expert witnesses on
the rationale that they were from the Rutland area, and therefore were more fa
miliar with the applicable standard to [sic] care.
Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 25, 510 A.2d 436,439 (1986). See also, Cook, 409 S.W.2d at
478 ("an attorney practicing in a vastly different locality would not be qualified to second
guess the judgement of an experienced attorney of the EI Paso County Bar ....").
36. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 665.
37. Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 675, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98, 109 (1960); R.
MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 254 ("The plaintiff may find extreme reluctance
among local practitioners to testify against a fellow attorney. ").
38. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 254.
39. See, e.g., Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1305 (1963);
Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771, 782 (1967-68); Comment,
New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. V.L. REV. 408, 417 (1976-77) [hereinafter
New Developments in Legal Malpractice].
40. This note ultimately concludes that a locality based standard is inappropriate not
only when the attorney's alleged negligence involves general principles of law, but also
when the alleged negligence involves the application of local rules, customs, or practices. A
locality based standard is inappropriate because these "local factors" are considered in the
knowledge portion of the standard of care. For discussion of the model standard of care
formulation proposed by this note, see infra Section III.
41. See, e.g., Palmer v. Nissen 256 F. Supp. 497, 501 n.lO (D. Me. 1966) ("The
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by the importance of local considerations.
In Russo, the alleged misconduct was attorney Griffin's failure to
advise his client of the desirability of a non-competition agreement
during a corporate buyout of a family held business. Advising a fam
ily held business in this situation is not unique to Rutland, Vermont.
Attorneys everywhere face similar situations. The standard of care
dictating the minimum acceptable advice given to a family held busi
ness structuring a buyout should not vary from locality to locality.42
A variation in standards is evident when two attorneys from dif
ferent localities are faced with advising the same type of client under
the same circumstances. In such a situation, adherence to a locality
rule prevents the trier of fact from using a uniform standard of care to
determine if the attorney was negligent, because the attorney's action
in each locality will be measured against what other attorneys in the
locality normally do. This, in effect, allows each locality to set its own
standard of care which means that where the members of the local bar
are collectively incompetent there will be a low standard of care in
that locality.43
Local considerations influencing an attorney's action, which may
justify the application of the locality rule by the court,44 are lacking in
parties agree that defendant's duty, as an attorney, to plaintiffs ... must be measured by the
standards of professional conduct prevailing in the community in which he did his work. ");
Mylar v. Wilkinson, 435 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Ala. 1983) ("[A] lawyer is required to exercise
an ordinary and reasonable level of skill, knowledge, care, attention, and prudence common
to members of the legal profession in the community."); Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 82,
378 S.W.2d 655, 661-62 (1964) (testimony of local attorney is evidence of the standard of
conduct for attorneys in that community); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263
La. 774, 786, 269 So. 2d 239, 244 (1972) ("An attorney is obligated to exercise at least that
degree of care, skill, and diligence which is exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in his
locality."); Dean v. Conn, 419 So. 2d 148, 150 (Miss. 1982) ("Both are required to exercise
that degree of care, skill and diligence which is commonly possessed and exercised by attor
neys/physicians in that locality."); Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 356, 329 S.E.2d 355,
366 (1985) (defining the third prong of the standard set out in Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C.
517,80 S.E.2d 144 (1954) as follows: "The standard is that of members of the profession in
the same or similar locality under similar circumstances."); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475,
477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (rejecting expert testimony on appropriate conduct under the
circumstances from an attorney who practiced in a different locality).
42. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 254. ("Although local considerations
are important, such consideration should not become a means of reducing the standard of
care or a means of insulating local attorneys. ").
43. A locality may also set a low standard of care if members of the local bar adhere
to a customary practice that is considered unacceptable in other jurisdictions. See infra
note 58 and accompanying text. A higher than expected standard is possible if all members
of the local bar are extremely well qualified, or if their customary practice exceeds what is
acceptable in other locales.
44. See sources cited supra note 41.
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other jurisdictions applying it. In Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
CO.45 the plaintiffs alleged their attorney was negligent in advising
them to accept a compromise agreement in settling their father's es
tate. 46 The court in Ramp defined the appropriate standard of care as
"that degree of care, skill, and diligence which is exercised by prudent
practicing attorneys in ... [the] ... locality."47 Although the locality
rule was designed to compensate for the difference in rules and prac
tices among localities, its application by the Louisiana court was un
necessary to effectuate that purpose. Considering the attorney's
locality was unnecessary because the issue in Ramp was not whether
the defendant misapplied a local rule or ordinance, but rather whether
the attorney was negligent in failing to advise the plaintiffs of their
rights under state law before having them sign a compromise agree
ment. Furthermore, although the court focused on the defendant-at
tomey's locality and applied the locality rule in determining whether
the attorney was negligent, the court held the attorney to a minimum
standard of care applicable to all members of the legal profession who
advise clients on succession rights, and did not differentiate on the ba
sis of locality.48 However, by applying a locality based standard, the
Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized that a court should focus on
how local attorneys act under the circumstances and not how a rea
sonable attorney would act. 49
The Mississippi Supreme Court also has applied the locality rule
to determine whether an attorney's actions were negligent even though
the actions may not have been influenced by local considerations. In
45. 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1972).
46. Id. at 782-85, 269 So. 2d at 242-43 (Attorney Plotkin advised the heirs to accept
a compromise agreement which settled the estate without advising them about their rights
under a forced portion.).
47. Id. at 786, 269 So. 2d at 244.
48. Id. at 787, 269 So. 2d at 244 ("According to the expert testimony in this case,
every lawyer undertaking to advise clients on succession rights must know the basic con
cepts of forced heirship .... Moreover, even without expert testimony we would necessar
ily take notice that a legal duty is breached when the attorney fails to recognize such an
obvious encroachment upon the legitime and to properly advise clients ....").
49. In Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 79, 82 (La. App. 1971)
the Louisiana Court of Appeals defined the standard of care as "that degree of care, skill
and diligence which is commonly possessed and exercised by practicing attorneys in his
jurisdiction ...." However, on appeal the Louisiana Supreme Court substituted "locality"
for "jurisdiction" without any explanation. Ramp, 263 La. at 787, 269 So. 2d at 244. Since
that decision. Louisiana courts have applied a locality based standard in legal malpractice
litigation even though the alleged negligence involved other than the application of local
rules, customs, or practices. See, e.g., Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274, 277 (La. App.
1977), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1223 (La. 1977); Watkins V. Sheppard, 278 So. 2d 890, 892
(La. App. Ct. 1973).
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Dean v. Conn 50 the issue was whether the attorney's inquiry into who
constituted heirs at law of the decedent's property was acceptable
when the attorney prepared a title certificate. 51 The court stated the
attorney's conduct was to be judged "in accordance with the knowl
edge, skill and ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members
of the legal profession in Alcorn County, Mississippi."52 However, as
in Russo and Ramp, the underlying issue did not involve the attorney's
application of a local rule or ordinance. Rather, the conduct involved
general legal skills. The fact that the decedent's property was located
in Alcorn County, as opposed to another county in Mississippi, should
not have affected the inquiry into how diligent an attorney must be in
researching and preparing a title. 53
Application of the locality rule in Dean did not limit the availabil
ity of local expert testimony because the plaintiff was able to produce a
local attorney to testify as to the appropriate standard of care.54 The
locality rule, however, did limit the scope of the expert's testimony
because the testimony specifically referred to the standard of care used
by attorneys in Alcorn County while researching and preparing ti
tles. 55 The expert testified, and the jury found, that the attorney did
not meet the appropriate standard. 56 However, had there been expert
testimony that attorneys in Alcorn County research and prepare titles
in the same fashion as the defendant did, and the finder of fact was
unwilling to find the local practice unreasonable,57 then the alleged
misconduct would have comported with the applicable standard of
care, and therefore the attorney would not have been negligent.
50.

419 So. 2d 148 (Miss. 1982).
Id. at 148.
52. Id.
53. See infra note 57.
54. Dean, 419 So. 2d at 151.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 151-54.
57. See, e.g., Gleason v. Title Guar. Co., 300 F.2d 813, 814 (5th Cir. 1962), reh'g
denied, 317 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963). In Gleason, the plaintiff-title insurance company sued
the defendant-attorney for damages arising from the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's
certification of clear title. Id. at 813. Although the defendant-attorney gave written certifi
cation that he had examined personally either the public records or an abstract to deter
mine clear title, he admitted at trial that he had relied on information given to him over the
telephone by an abstract company. Id. at 814. The defendant-attorney defended his ac
tions, arguing "that it was customary in Brevard County, Florida, ... for lawyers to make
certifications of title as he had done ...." Id. The court rejected the defendant's reliance
on the local custom, stating: "While custom provides an important indication of what con
stitutes reasonable care and what is negligent, it is not dispositive of the question at issue.
All customs are not good customs, and lawyers have no prescriptive right to make know
ingly false statements in the name of custom." Id. (citation omitted).
51.
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As the above cases illustrate, the application of the locality rule
does not always relate to the application of local rules or ordinances
that affect an attorney's action. The issues facing the attorneys in
Russo, Ramp, and Dean were legal problems that confront attorneys
everywhere. The continued adherence to a locality based standard
hinders the prosecution of legal malpractice claims because it limits
available expert witnesses. The application of the locality rule also
allows different results between communities because it allows a local
ity to set its own standard. The standard set in a particular commu
nity may be considered unacceptable in other communities or states,
thus creating a variation among jurisdictions. 58 These deficiencies of
the locality rule indicate a need for courts or legislatures to formulate
a standard of care which effectively prescribes acceptable attorney
conduct under the circumstances regardless of where the attorney
practices.
C.

The Statewide Standard of Care

Faced with a challenge to the locality rule, the Vermont Supreme
Court overruled its prior decisions and adopted a standard of care
based upon the" 'degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge com
monly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent
lawyer in the practice of law in this jurisdiction.' "59
58. Even under a locality based standard, if the standard of care set by the customary
actions of local attorneys is too low, then that standard should be rejected by the court. Id.
A low standard of care set by a locality should be rejected because:
[n]o group of individuals and no industry or trade can be permitted, by adopting
careless and slipshod methods to save time, effort or money, to set its own uncon
trolled standard at the expense of the rest of the community. If the only test is to
be what has always been done, no one will ever have any great incentive to make
any progress in the direction of safety. It follows, therefore, that whenever the
particular circumstances, the risk, or other elements in the case are such that a
reasonable man would not conform to the custom, the actor may be found negli
gent for conforming to it ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A comment c (1977).
59. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986) (quoting Cook, Flana
gan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393,395,438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968)). An intermediate
standard of care formulation which Russo did not consider is a standard based upon the
members of the legal profession in the same or similar locality under similar circumstances.
See. e.g., Smith v. Lewis 13 Cal. 3d 349, 356 n.3, 530 P.2d 589,592-93 n.3, 118 Cal. Rptr.
621, 624 n.3 (1975). The same or similar locality/situation standard expands the scope of
the standard beyond the attorney's locality to include those localities where attorneys are
engaged in similar practice or to include the attorneys who are engaged in the same prac
tice in similar localities. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment g (1977)
("The standard is rather that of persons engaged in similar practices in similar localities,
considering geographic location, size, and the character of the community in generaL").
The expanded standard assumes that the legal practice in the similar localities is the same
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In overturning the locality rule, the court noted that the rule has
been rejected in medical malpractice litigation because of the immuni
zation of local practitioners from malpractice liability and a conspir
acy of silence among potential expert witnesses in the plaintiff's
10cality.60 In Russo, the defendant-Griffin argued that the reasoning
used to reject the locality rule in medical malpractice litigation was
inapplicable to legal malpractice. Griffin claimed the important differ
ence between legal and medical malpractice is that knowledge of local
practices, rules and customs is essential to proper legal practice, while
such local knowledge is not a concern for the medical practitioner. 61
The court, however, rejected that argument. 62
The court agreed with Griffin that "'knowledge of local prac
tices, rules or customs may be determinative of, and essential to, the
exercise of adequate care and skill.' "63 However, the court held that
an attorney's knowledge of local factors did not mandate the contin
ued application of the locality rule because knowledge of local prac
tices, rules, or customs is included in the "knowledge" portion of the
standard. 64 Because attorneys in Vermont are required to "familiarize
themselves with . . . practices, rules, or customs peculiar to their
area,"65 the Russo court formulated the issue as whether a reasonable
and prudent attorney would know of the local rule, custom, or prac
tice and its application. 66
In formulating its standard, the Vermont Supreme Court chose
and therefore the factors influencing the attorney's action are the same. Smith, 13 Cal. 3d
at 355 n.3, 358, 530 P.2d at 592-93 n.3, 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 624 n.3, 627 (approving jury
instructions that the defendant attorney had a duty "to use the care and skill ordinarily
exercised in like case by reputable members of his profession practicing in the same or
similar locality under similar circumstances"). The effect of this expanded standard is that
it allows experts from similar localities to testify on behalf of local plaintiffs. Allowing
outside expert testimony prevents the immunization of local practitioners from malpractice
liability and it also breaks the conspiracy of silence. The expanded locality standard, how
ever, cannot assure the elimination of potentially unacceptable attorney conduct in a local
ity because, even though it allows outside testimony, the standard of care in the similar
communities may be the same unacceptable conduct that is being challenged. See infra
note 110 and accompanying text.
60. Russo, 147 Vt. at 23, 510 A.2d at 438. For a discussion of decisions rejecting the
locality rule in medical malpractice litigation, see infra section II. For a discussion of
immunization of local practitioners and the conspiracy of silence in legal malpractice litiga
tion, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
61. Russo, 147 Vt. at 23, 510 A.2d at 438.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 24, 510 A.2d at 438 (quoting R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at
§ 254).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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the state boundary as a geographic limitation67 because the court
found persuasive the argument that "the rules governing the practice
of law do not vary from community to community but are the same
throughout the state."68 The court also noted that all Vermont attor
neys must meet the same bar admission standards. 69 By selecting the
state of Vermont as a basis for the standard of care, the court insured
that all attorneys practicing within the state were subject to the same
standard of care.
In Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing70 the Washington
Supreme Court defined the standard of care for attorneys as one based
upon the skill and diligence of attorneys practicing within the state. 71
The Washington court, unlike Vermont, did not cite the medical-legal
analogy as a basis for defining the standard of care for attorneys as one
that is the same throughout the state.72 Rather, the court cited the
fact that "the standards of practice for lawyers in this jurisdiction as a
qualification for the practice of law are the same throughout the state
and do not differ in its various communities."73 Thus, the Washington
court recognized that all attorneys in the state should be required to
meet a minimum standard of care.
Even though adopting a statewide standard of care eliminates po
tential differences in the standard between localities within a given
state, it does not eliminate potential differences in the standard be
tween states. Also, the limitation of outside expert testimony by a
statewide standard of care creates the potential for a standard within
the state which is unacceptable.74 If all Vermont attorneys acquiesce
67.

Id.
Id. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. In comment g, the
Restatement indicates that allowance for the type of community is "made in professions or
trades where there is considerable variation in the skill and knowledge possessed by those
practicing in different localities ... [but in the legal profession] ... such variations either do
not exist or are not significant." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment g
(1977).
69. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24, 510 A.2d 436,438 (1986).
70. 73 Wash. 2d 393, 438 P.2d 865 (1968).
71. Id. at 395, 438 P.2d at 867 ("the correct standard to which the [attorney] is held
in the performance of his professional services is that degree of care, skill, diligence and
knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer
in the practice of law in this jurisdiction").
72. The Washington Supreme Court in Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 77,
431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967), while overturning the use of a locality rule in medical malprac
tice litigation, stated "[W]e note that the law of this jurisdiction has never recognized a
difference in the professional competency of a lawyer in a small community from that of the
professional competency required of a lawyer in a large city."
73. Cook, 73 Wash. at 395, 438 P.2d at 866.
74. Although the standard of care may refer to how attorneys in this jurisdiction or
68.
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in customary practices that may be or are considered unacceptable in
other jurisdictions and the standard of care is that of a reasonable Ver
mont attorney, then the testimony by Vermont attorneys regarding
what is acceptable legal conduct necessarily sets a low standard in the
state.
D.

The National or General Standard

The Vermont Supreme Court stopped short of adopting a na
tional standard of care for legal malpractice litigation because
"[u]nlike the medical profession, the legal profession has not yet estab
lished a certification and licensing process which is national in
scope."75 Justice Hayes, in a separate opinion, agreed that the locality
standard should be abolished, but advocated in its place a "standard of
care based upon the legal profession generally."76 Justice Hayes noted
that doctors in Vermont are subject to a general standard of care based
upon how a reasonable member of the medical profession would act
and therefore Vermont lawyers should be subject to a similar
standard. 77
Justice Hayes supported his argument for a general profession
standard by noting the national nature of law school training and con
tinuing legal education programs. 78 He also cited the emergence of
multistate bar examinations as supporting a general standard, reason
ing that if candidates for admission to the Vermont Bar must pass a
multistate bar examination then they should be required to meet more
than just a state standard of care. 79 The general profession standard
also eliminates potential discrepancies in attorney performance based
state would act under the circumstances, the customary local practice may be rejected by
the court as being unreasonable. See supra note 57.
75. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 25, 510 A.2d 436, 439 (1986) (citing R. MALLEN &
V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 254).
76. Id. at 25-26, 510 A.2d at 439 (Hayes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
77. Id. at 26, 510 A.2d at 439.
78. Id.
79. Id. Presumably, Justice Hayes argues that the use of a multistate bar examina
tion supports the adoption of a national or general standard of care because the multistate
exam was designed to provide local bar examiners with a uniform test of legal competence.
See, Covington, The Multistate Bar Examination-A New Approach, 26 ARK. L. REV. 153,
155 (1972) ("The philosophy of the multistate bar examination program is to prepare an
examination which will be adopted and used by the states with the assistance of the
NCBE."). It is the standardization of the examination that underscores the national stan
dard argument because initially "[c]onsideration was given to the possibility of regarding
the new test as a 'national bar examination' so that applicants who pass the test would be
admitted to practice in all states participating in the program." Id. However, because the
multistate bar examination is a doctrine-oriented examination and much of a lawyer's daily
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upon geography. No longer would expert testimony from outside the
state be excluded as irrelevant to the plaintiff's burden of establishing
that the defendant-attorney breached the appropriate standard of care
within the state. 80 Eliminating discrepancies in the standard of care
between states was important to Justice Hayes because he realized that
standards which resulted in attorney conduct being considered negli
gent in one state and acceptable in another would lower the public's
respect for the legal profession. 81
The Georgia Supreme Court in Kellos v. Sawilowsky,82 faced with
the issue of whether the appropriate standard of care for legal mal
practice is that of attorneys practicing within the state of Georgia or a
general profession standard, rejected a geographic limitation and
adopted a standard of care formulation based upon the legal profes
sion generally.83 The Kellos court concluded that the standard of care
required of an attorney is constant regardless of where the attorney
practices. 84 The court did note, however, that for "practicality in
pleading" the standard was that of the state of Georgia because there
was no "ascertainable standard of the 'legal . . . profession gener
ally.' "85 This "practicality in pleading" reference does not affect the
Georgia court's adherence to a national or general standard because
the court maintained that expert testimony must be based upon " 'the
standard of care in the legal profession generally' " rather than that of
a locality.86 The court held that only the application of the standard
varies from situation to situation. 87
activities are transaction-oriented, using the existence of the multistate examination to jus
tify adopting a national standard of care may be subject to criticism.
80. In his dissent, Justice Hayes pointed out that the state standard of care would
allow the same conduct under the same circumstances to be considered negligent in New
Hampshire and acceptable in Vermont. Russo, 147 Vt. at 26, 510 A.2d at 439 (Hayes, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Allowing lawyers from other states to testify as
experts as to how a reasonable and prudent attorney would have handled the situation
would eliminate these discrepancies because the inquiry would be how any reasonable at
torney would have acted and not how attorneys in a particular state would have acted.
81. Id. This problem may arise even though most, if not all, people may not know or
care what the required standard of care is for attorneys in their state. Those individuals
who file a legal malpractice claim only to discover they cannot recover because, while their
attorney's conduct would be considered negligent elsewhere, it conforms to the local stan
dard of care, naturally will be critical of the legal profession for "protecting their own."
82. 254 Ga. 4, 325 S.E.2d 757 (1985).
83. Id. at 5, 325 S.E.2d at 757-58.
84. Id. at 5, 325 S.E.2d at 758.
85. Id. at 5-6, 325 S.E.2d at 758.
86. Id. at 4-5,325 S.E.2d at 757-58 (quoting Storrs v. Wills, 170 Ga. App. 179, 181,
316 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1984».
87. Id. at 5, 325 S.E.2d at 758. For the Kellos court, these variations in the standard
occur because the general standard applied in a given case is particularized by "the number
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The alleged negligence in Kellos was the attorney's failed attempt
to arrange a silent one-half interest in a corporation for a client. 88 The
attorney's action in Kellos was governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code, and the application of standard legal principles such as the Uni
form Commercial Code should not differ depending on the state of the
attorney's practice. As in Russo, Ramp, and Dean, the attorney in Kel
los was not applying a local rule or practice; rather, the attorney at
tempted to structure a transaction which was governed by a uniform
rule applicable throughout the United States. 89 An attorney's ar
rangement of a business transaction which is governed by a uniform
rule should be judged by how any reasonable attorney would act under
the same circumstances and not by how Georgia attorneys would act.
New Hampshire has adopted by statute what appears to be a gen
eral standard of care for malpractice litigation:
In determining whether the person against whom a malpractice
claim has been made has met the applicable standard of care, the
jury or judge shall not be bound or limited by the standard of care
accepted or established with respect to any particular geographical
area or locality, but shall consider only whether the person against
whom the claim is made has acted with due care having in mind the
standards and recommended practices and procedures of his profes
sion, and the training, experience and professed degree of skill of the
average practitioner of such profession, and all other relevant
circumstances. 9o

Although no reported decisions specifically hold the statute applicable
to legal malpractice litigation, other New Hampshire legislation make
its applicability clear. 91 This statute eliminates any reference to a geo
of options available to the attorney and the amount of time which he has to consider
them." Id. at 5, 325 S.E.2d at 758 (quoting Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 851, 227
S.E.2d 802 (1976». The standard is particularized because it is these circumstances that
are important to the determination of what is reasonable legal conduct. Id.
88. Kellos v. Sawilowsky, 172 Ga. App. 263, 263, 322 S.E.2d 897, 897 (1984). In the
original lawsuit the plaintiff alleged there was an oral agreement that she was to be a silent
stockholder in a corporation through a series of loans repayable in stock. The court ap
plied provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to assess the validity of the arrangement.
Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc., 245 Ga. 130, 133, 263 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1980).
89. Kellos, 245 Ga. at 133 n.2, 263 S.E.2d at 140 n.2.
90. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:13 (1983).
91. Id. at § 519-A:2. This section sets up an alternative disposition mechanism for
professional malpractice claims. In defining the potential claims covered, the statute pro
vides in part that:
Any person, or his legal representative, claiming damages by reason of injury,
death, or monetary loss on account of alleged professional malpractice may infor
mally and voluntarily submit against any lawyer, doctor, or dentist, against
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graphic area or locality in determining whether the defendant-profes
sional has met the applicable standard of care. Instead the statute
requires the finder of fact to focus on whether the defendant-profes
sional acted in conformity with the standards of the particular
profession.

E. A General Standard for the Legal Specialist
The Russo court, even though unwilling to adopt a national stan
dard of care for a general practitioner, indicated a willingness to apply
a national standard to the legal specialist. 92 The need for uniformity
in the practice of certain areas of law such as federal income taxation,
securities law, patent law, and bankruptcy law justified the application
of a standard devoid of any geographic limitation. 93
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Walker v. Bangs,94 recog
nized a national standard in certain cases when it held that a Califor
nia lawyer could testify in a Washington court regarding the proper
standard of care for prosecuting a federal maritime claim.95 A territo
rial limitation on expert testimony in Walker was unnecessary because
it involved a federally created claim governed by the substantive rules
of maritime law and the federal rules of evidence and civil proce
dure. 96 As the Walker court noted, if defendant-attorneys hold them
selves out as "specialists" then they should be judged against others
who practice in the same field regardless of their locality.97
whom he believes there is a reasonable basis for a claim to a hearing panel prior to
the institution of any litigation as to said claim, and not thereafter.
Id. Another section of the chapter setting out the alternative disposition mechanism is
entitled "Locality Rule Inapplicable" and contains the exact language of N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 508:13 except that "hearing panel" is substituted for "jury or judge." N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 519-A:7 (1974). It is clear, then, that the New Hampshire Legislature has
abolished the application of the locality rule when a plaintiff presents a legal malpractice
claim to the hearing panel. Therefore, because of the almost identical language in 508: 13
and 519-A:7, it is likely that the locality rule is also inapplicable when a plaintiff elects to
pursue actual litigation. Also, the New Hampshire Legislature made it clear that a general
standard of care should be applied to determine what constitutes professional negligence.
92. Russo, 147 Vt. at 25,510 A.2d at 439.
93. Id.
94. 92 Wash. 2d 854, 601 P.2d 1279 (1979).
95. Id. at 857, 601 P.2d at 1282. In allowing expert testimony from an out of state
attorney, the court noted "the fact that Allan Brotsky is not licensed to practice in this
state should go to the weight, not the admissibility of his testimony ...." Id. at 859, 601
P.2d at 1282. Arguably, a court's indication that the fact that an attorney-witness is from
outside the state affects the weight of his or her testimony may be infusing considerations of
locality back into the general standard.
96. Id. at 859, 601 P.2d at 1283.
97. Id. at 860, 601 P.2d at 1283.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD OF CARE IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

Because of the similarity in the standard of care formulation for
legal and medical practitioners,98 analyzing the evolution of the medi
cal standard from a strict locality to a general profession standard is
important to the discussion of the evolution of the legal malpractice
standard. 99
The early medical malpractice cases applied a standard of care
which focused on the locality of the physician's practice. loo Courts
considered the physician's locality important because "[i]n the smaller
towns and country, those who practice medicine and surgery, though
often possessing a thorough theoretical knowledge of the highest ele
ments of the profession, do not enjoy so great opportunities of daily
observation and practical operations ... as those have who [sic] reside
in the metropolitan towns ...."101 The distinction between the rural
and urban physician meant the rural physician "should not be ex
pected to exercise that high degree of skill and practical knowledge
possessed by those having greater facilities for performing and witness
ing operations."102
Courts expanded the locality rule in the late nineteenth century to
include similar communities because its application "effectively immu
nized from malpractice liability any doctor who happened to be the
sole practitioner in his community."103 The North Carolina Supreme
98. See supra note 9.
99. The evolution of the medical standard served as a basis for the Russo court to
expand and change the legal malpractice standard in Vermont. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt.
20, 23, 510 A.2d 436,438 (1986).
100. See, e.g., Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286, 289-90 (1872); Tefft v. Wilcox, 6
Kan. 46, 62-64 (1870); Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136 (1880).
101. Tefft, 6 Kan. at 63-64.
102. Id. at 64. See also Smothers, 34 Iowa at 289-90 ("It is also ... true that the
standard of ordinary skill may vary even in the same state, according to the greater or
lesser opportunities afforded by the locality, for observation and practice, from which alone
the highest degree of skill can be acquired."). The court in Small stated:
It is a matter of common knowledge that a physician in a small country village
does not usually make a specialty of surgery, and, however well informed he may
be in the theory of all parts of his profession ... [h]e would have but few opportu
nities of observation and practice in that line such as public hospitals or large
cities would afford.
Small, 128 Mass. at 136; Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall a/the Locality Rule in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408, 412 (1969) (The early locality nile com
pensated for the disparity of educational and training opportunities between the rural and
urban medical practitioner.).
103. Waltz, supra note 102, at 411.
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Court in McCracken v. Smathers 104 recognized the potential immuni
zation of doctors:
The degree of care and skill required is that possessed and exercised
by the ordinary members of his profession .... It cannot be mea
sured simply by the profession in the neighborhood ... [because]
... '[n]eighborhood' might be construed into a very limited area
.... It might contain but few dentists ... [and] ... [b]oth might be
men of very inferior qualifications, and to say that they may set
themselves up as the standard of a learned profession, and prove the
standing of each by the ability of the other, would be equally unjust
to the profession and to its patients. 105

The medical malpractice standard of care has evolved in many
jurisdictions to exclude reference to the physician's locality.106 The
104. 122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E. 354 (1898).
105. Id. at 803, 29 S.E. at 355.
106. See. e.g., Green v. U.S. 530 F. Supp. 633, 642 (D. Wis. 1982) ("degree of skill
usually exercised by the average practitioner acting in the same or similar circumstances");
aff'd, 709 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1983); May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596, 600 (Ala. 1982) ("The
language 'same general neighborhood' refers to the national medical neighborhood or na
tional medical community, or reasonably competent physicians acting in the same or simi
lar circumstances."); Zills v. Brown, 382 So. 2d 528, 532 (Ala. 1980) ("[W]e are inclined to
view that Alabama's 'same general neighborhood' rule does in fact encompass a national
standard of care for reasonably skilled physicians acting in the same or similar circum
stances ...."); Sikorski v. Bell, 167 Ga. App. 803, 805, 307 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1983) ("The
standard of care for physicians ... is not for the particular locality or community where the
tort was committed but the standard of care considered by the profession generally to rep
resent a reasonable degree of care and skill." (citations omitted)); Shilkret v. Annapolis
Emergency Medical Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187,200, 349 A.2d 245,253 (1975) ("We ...
hold that a physician is under a duty to use that degree of care and skill which is expected
of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to which he belongs, acting in the
same or similar circumstances."); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235 N.E.2d 793,
798 (1968) ("The proper standard of care is whether the physician ... has exercised the
degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking into account the ad
vances in the profession."); Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 254, 180 N.W.2d 788, 791
(1969) ("geographic conditions, or circumstances control neither the standard of a special
ist's care nor the competence of an expert's testimony"); Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856,
871 (Miss. 1985):
In the care and treatment of each patient, each physician has a non-delegable
duty to render professional services consistent with that objectively ascertained
minimally acceptable level of competence he may be expected to apply given the
qualifications and level of expertise he holds himself out as possessing and given
the circumstances of the particular case.
King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478, 482, 279 S.E.2d 618,620 (1981) ("Having reconsidered and
examined the viability of the 'locality rule' in South Carolina today, we hereby discard this
rule and adopt a standard of care not bound by any geographic restrictions."); Farrow v.
Health Seh. Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1979) ("that degree of skill and learning
ordinarily possessed and exercised, under similar circumstances, by other practitioners in
his field of practice"); Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 79, 431 P.2d 973, 978
(1967) ("No longer is it proper to limit the definition of the standard of care which a
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Maryland Court of Appeals in Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Medi
cal Hospital Association 107 responded to changes in the medical profes
sion by adopting a national standard of care rejecting not only the
locality rule, but also the similar locality rule. lOS The court rejected
the similar locality rule because although it allows experts from other
communities to testify as to what is acceptable conduct, there is still
the potential for an unacceptable standard of care. This unacceptable
standard may arise because the standard in the other communities
may be the same standard of care as that being chailenged. 109 The
court in Shilkret adopted a national standard because:
[w]hatever may have justified the strict locality rule fifty or a hun
dred years ago, it cannot be reconciled with the realities of today.
'New techniques and discoveries are available to all doctors within a
short period of time through medical journals, closed circuit televi
sion presentations, special radio networks for doctors, tape recorded
digests of medical literature, and current correspondence courses.'
[Citation omitted.] More importantly, the quality of medical school
training itself has improved dramatically in the last century . . . .
[T]here now exists a national accrediting system which has contrib
uted to the standardization of medical schools throughout the
country. 110

Just as the medical standard responded to changes in the medical
profession, the standard of care in legal malpractice has responded to
changes within the legal profession. 1 1 I However, evolution of the
standard of care for legal malpractice from a strict locality to a na
tional standard has been slower. This resistance to change stems from
the presumption that "local considerations" are more important to the
legal standard than they are to the medical standard. 112 However, the
medical doctor or dentist must meet solely to the practice or custom of a particular locality,
similar locality, or geographic area."); Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 283-84, 206
N.W.2d 166, 174 (1973) ("that degree of care and skill which is exercised by the average
practitioner in the class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances").
107. 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245, 248 (1975).
108. Id. at 196, 199, 349 A.2d at 250, 252.
109. Id. at 196, 349 A.2d at 250.
110. Id. at 194, 349 A.2d at 249 (quoting Note, An Evaluation 0/ Changes in the
Medical Standard o/Care, 23 VAND. L. REV. 729, 732 (1970)).
Ill. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 25, 510 A.2d436, 438-39 (1986). The Russo court
cited specialization as one factor that would support a national standard in some areas of
practice. Id. at 25, 510 A.2d at 439. Also, the court cited the fact that the legal profession
has yet to establish a national certification and licensing process similar to the medical
profession as the reason for rejecting a national standard. Id. However, the court's lan
guage indicates that if the legal profession adopted a national certification and licensing
process, the Vermont court may be willing to change the standard of care in response to it.
112. See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 871 (Miss. 1985). In rejecting the
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existence of local factors, such as rules, practices, or customs, should
not arbitrarily define the required standard of care in legal malpractice
litigation by limiting the inquiry of proper conduct to a particular geo
graphic area. 113 Instead, these local factors should be incorporated
into the standard of care.
Although the Russo court used the medico-legal malpractice
analogy as one reason to reject the locality rule in legal malpractice
litigation, 114 it was not the court's sole rationale for changing the stan
dard. The court also observed that "[i]n Vermont, the rules governing
the practice of law do not vary from community to community but are
the same throughout the state."115 The court also noted that Vermont
bar admission standards require that all attorneys wishing to practice
in the state successfully meet established admission standards. I 16
A geographic limitation on the standard of care can protect attor
neys from being second-guessed on the application of local law by
those who are unfamiliar with it. Another, less justifiable reason may
be that the local bar has a "club" atmosphere and distrusts the inter
ference of "outsiders." However, a standard of care formulation with
out any geographic limitation yet incorporating all relevant local
factors would offer the same "protection" as the locality rule without
the adverse side effects of immunizing local practitioners or promoting
a conspiracy of silence.

III.
A.

A

MODEL STANDARD OF CARE

The Model Standard Defined

A comprehensive standard of care should incorporate the criteria
necessary to determine the adequacy of the attorney's conduct in a
particular situation. 117 Richard E. Mallen and Victor B. Levit, in
their book Legal Malpractice,118 succinctly incorporate the necessary
criteria into a "standard of competence" that is devoid of any geo
graphic limitation: "the attorney should exercise the skill and knowl
locality rule in medical malpractice litigation, the Mississippi Supreme Court implied that
it would continue to adhere to the locality rule in legal malpractice litigation. The court
stated: "common sense and experience inform us that the laws of medicine do not vary
from state to state in anything like the manner our public law does." Id. at 870. For a
discussion of Mississippi's locality rule for legal malpractice litigation, see supra notes 50
57 and accompanying text.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 44-58.
114. Russo, 147 Vt. at 23-25, 510 A.2d at 437-38.
115. Id. at 24, 510 A.2d at 438. See also supra notes 71-73.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
118. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3.
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edge ordinarily possessed by attorneys under similar circumstances." 119
Under the Mallen and Levit standard, however, "[c]onsiderations
of locality, custom and special skills are treated as the 'similar circum
stances.' "120 Mallen and Levit include "locality" as a similar circum
stance because they treat it as a form of specialization,121 which arises
when the attorney is knowledgeable of local considerations, such as
local rules, practices, and customs, which may be essential to a client's
representation. 122 If the malpractice claim is based on an attorney's
misapplication of a local practice or rule, then the question under a
general standard of care would be whether a reasonable attorney
would know of the rule or custom's existence and its practical
applications. 123
Although Mallen and Levit do not advocate abolishing the local
ity rule,124 the standard of competence they advocate provides a useful
model for courts to follow. The similar circumstances aspect of the
model allows a judge to define the applicable standard of care for the
jury, using the specific facts of the litigation. 125 Utilizing this model,
the appropriate standard of care formulation in Russo would be:
Attorney Griffin should have exercised the knowledge and skill or
dinarily possessed by attorneys advising a family held business on
how to structure a corporate buyout when one of the parties wishes
to sell his or her interest in the corporation in order to start a new,
but different, business venture in the same community.

This formulation is an objectively based standard which incorpo
rates all of the relevant factors that should have influenced attorney
Griffin's advice. The model standard determines acceptable legal con
duct by comparing Griffin's conduct, not with that of other Rutland
area attorneys, but rather with the conduct of any reasonable attorney
in similar circumstances. 126
Id. at § 251 (emphasis in original).
Id.
121. Id. at § 254.
122. Id. Arguably, considering the attorney's locality in this manner may infuse a
geographic limitation into the general standard of competence.
123. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 24, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986).
124. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 254 ("As with specialization, the
erosion of local standards should be approached cautiously, aware of the practical conse
quences of change and only on a case by case basis.").
125. Id. at § 251 n.15.
126. By eliminating reference to the attorney's locality, the model standard of care
may make the "local or customary" standard a risky and unreliable guide by which an
attorney may gauage his or her conduct. Arguably, a national or general standard of care
may not be certain enough to provide attorneys with a prospective guide by which they
119.

120.
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The Rationale for the Model Standard

The model standard has a number of advantages. Its focus on
how a reasonable attorney would act under similar circumstances per
mits expert testimony regarding acceptable conduct from attorneys
who practice outside the locality. This outside expert testimony pre
vents the immunization of local practitioners from malpractice liabil
ity because, although the inquiry remains a question of fact,127 the
model focuses on the circumstances that affected the attorney's deci
sion and not the location of his or her practice.
The model also promotes consistency. Under a locality rule, con
duct may be considered negligent in one state and under exactly the
same circumstances be considered acceptable in another, because each
state restricts expert testimony to local attorneys.128 The model pre
vents this inconsistency because, although many expert witnesses will
still be from within the general area of the defendant's practice, 129 the
trier of fact will not be predisposed to disregard the out of state exmay structure their conduct. Although this desire for a prospective guide is justifiable, our
tort system traditionally has been reactive in defining what is considered negligent conduct.
See supra note 57. Even though a state standard of care may provide more guidance for
local attorneys through state bar journals and 10caIly conducted continuing legal education
programs, this note advocates a national or general standard to avoid the situation where
the same conduct is considered negligent in one state and acceptable in another. Further
more, looking to other local attorneys or the state bar may not be adequate because the
majority of legal malpractice claims involve the basic principles of good legal practice to
which all attorneys should adhere, regardless of the location of their practice. For example,
Attorney William Gates explains that:
The information derived from the reports on errors is given more analytical sig
nificance by grouping the aIleged errors under the foIlowing broad headings: Ad
ministrative errors, substantive errors, client-relations errors, and 'intentional'
wrongs. This approach shows that 26.3% of the claims are made because of ad
ministrative matters such as calendaring, lost files, procrastination, and clerical
error. Substantive errors result in 43.8% of the claims with the greatest errors
consisting of the following: Failure to know or properly apply the law, inade
quate investigation, planning error, and failure to know about a deadline. Client
relations errors, such as failure to obtain consent or inform client, failure to fol
low client's instructions, and improper withdrawal, result in 16.2% of the claims.
Intentional wrongs, such as abuse of process, fraud, and civil rights violations,
make up 11 % of all claims.
Gates, supra note 2, at 562.
127. Because the inquiry remains a question of fact, expert testimony generally will
still be required to provide the trier of fact with a standard by which to judge the defend
ant-attorney's conduct. Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. 597, 598, 427 N.E.2d 1169,
1170 (1981) (Expert testimony is required unless "the claimed legal malpractice is so gross
or obvious that laymen can rely on their common knowledge or experience to recognize or
infer negligellce from the facts. ").
128. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
129. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 667. ("Both parties prefer to obtain
a local expert of sufficient reputation so as to impress or be known by the jury.").
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perts' testimony simply because they are from a different 10cale. 130
Because it focuses on reasonable conduct under the circum
stances, the model standard of care does not prejudice general practi
tioners by subjecting them to a standard which compares their
conduct to that of a legal specialist. 13l While the use of specialists as
experts raises a concern that they will become "hired guns" for plain
tiffs and thereby raise the standard of care, this concern may be over
stated. The model standard of care necessarily will be defined by the
facts of the litigation. For example, an attorney who specializes in
stock transfers may not be a universally competent witness to testify
regarding what advice a reasonable attorney would give a small closely
held family business structuring a stock transfer between relatives. A
specialist could testify only if he or she is experienced in similar situa
tions or is familiar with what is considered appropriate advice under
the circumstances. Also, the expert's testimony will not relate to how
he or she would have advised the client but to how a reasonable attor
ney would advise the client under the specific circumstances.
Defining the standard of care by the circumstances of the case
also makes the state boundary limitation unnecessary. If the attor
ney's conduct giving rise to the malpractice suit involves the applica
tion of a local or state substantive or procedural rule, then that
"circumstance" would necessarily limit the available experts to those
attorneys who are familiar with the rule.132 In this situation, the out
130. Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 22, 510 A.2d 436, 437 (1986) ("The court ulti
mately chose to accept the testimony of defendant's, rather than plaintiff's, expert wit
nesses on the premise that 'those attorneys whose practice primarily was conducted in the
Rutland area. . . are more familiar with the standard of care. . . required of lawyers.' ")
(quoting the trial court's findings of fact).
131. However, there may be circumstances where a reasonable general practitioner
would not handle a case because of its sophistication and therefore would have a duty to
refer the client to a specialist. Home v. Peckman, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 414-15, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 714, 720 (1979); Russo, 147 Vt. at 25, 510 A.2d at 439. If the general practitioner
fails to refer a client to a specialist and is allegedly negligent in handling the case, then that
attorney should be held to the standard of care of attorneys specializing in the particular
field. To hold the general practitioner to a different standard of care deprives the client of
an assurance of reasonable representation under the circumstances.
132. If the alleged negligence is the attorney's misapplication of a procedural or sub
stantive rule, then the issue would be how a reasonable attorney would have applied the
rule. Attorneys who are familiar with the rule or a similar rule's application would be
competent to testify. If the alleged negligence is the attorney's unawareness of the rule,
then the issue would be whether a reasonable attorney would have become familiar with the
rule before representing the client. Any attorney would be competent to testify whether a
reasonable attorney would investigate the matter before representing a client. Also, even
though the statute of limitations for a particular claim may vary from state to state, any
attorney would be competent to testify that it is a breach of the attorney's professional duty
to allow a statute of limitations to run, thereby barring a client's claim.
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of state attorney inexperienced with the rule or its application is not a
competent witness.
The Russo court stated that certain areas of substantive law
those that concern "national law" where "[i]t would be. . . inappro
priate to have different standards of care in the practice of . . . [these
areas] from state to state"133-lend themselves to a general standard of
care. 134 However, other non-national substantive areas of law such as
tort and contract are also based upon general legal principles which
cut across jurisdictional boundaries.135 It may be inappropriate for
the standard of care regarding these general principles of law to vary
from state to state. 136 The model standard facilitates the adoption of a
standard which is national in scope yet fair to the local bar, because it
limits expert testimony to attorneys familiar with legitimate local dif
ferences. The expert is also familiar with the particular area of prac
tice involved in the malpractice litigation.137
The model also provides courts with a standard of care formula
tion that allows for comprehensive jury instructions. By defining the
issue in terms of how a reasonable attorney would act under the cir
cumstances of the case, the court gives the finder of fact a standard by
which to evaluate conflicting expert testimony. 138 Utilizing the model
standard to formulate jury instructions and to determine the accepta
bility of the defendant-attorney's conduct under the circumstances of
the case is the same task that society imposes on the judicial system in
any negligence claim.
133. Russo, 147 Vt. at 25, 510 A.2d at 439 ("federal taxation law, securities law,
patent law, and bankruptcy law").
134. Id.
135. In designing the multistate bar examination, the National Committee of Bar
Examiners chose contracts, criminal law, evidence, real property, and torts as substantive
areas of law that could be tested on a national scale. Covington, supra note 79, at 154.
136. Even though some legal principles, such as comparative versus contributory
negligence, may vary from state to state, the appropriate conduct of an attorney practicing
in a comparative negligence state necessarily should not be measured solely against other
attorneys practicing in that state. The question should be how a reasonable attorney would
act under the circumstances, one of the circumstances being that the jurisdiction applies
comparative negligence principles. If the attorney from a comparative negligence jurisdic
tion represents a client in a jurisdiction applying contributory negligence principles, the
question remains how a reasonable attorney would act under the circumstance of being in a
contributory negligence jurisdiction. Holding the out of state attorney to the same stan
dard of care is necessary to protect a client from the attorney's ignorance of the foreign law.
New Developments in Legal Malpractice, supra note 39, at 420-21.
137. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 3, at § 251 n.15.
138. See supra pages 404-07 for the formulation of the standard of care applicable in
Russo.
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CONCLUSION

Russo v. Griffin is a step in the right direction. The Vermont
Supreme Court realized that the locality rule in legal malpractice liti
gation is no longer justified. However, the court's focus on the anal
ogy to the evolving standard of care in medical malpractice litigation
is unfortunate; the court was unwilling to adopt a "national or gen
eral" standard until the legal profession adopts a national certification
and licensing process similar to that of the medical field. 139
An analysis of the rationale for the locality rule indicates that any
geographic limitation is inappropriate in defining the required stan
dard of care. The issue for the trier of fact should be whether the
attorney acted reasonably under the circumstances and not whether
his or her actions conformed with how other local attorneys act. A
locality rule unnecessarily limits available expert witnesses, potentially
insulates local attorneys from liability, and promotes a conspiracy of
silence. Defining the standard of care in terms of what is reasonable
conduct under the specific circumstances of the case eliminates these
deficiencies of the locality rule while providing a minimum standard
which all attorneys must meet.
The model proposed by this note provides a standard which is fair
to both the legal profession and the public. Attorneys are assured that
their conduct will be judged only against other attorneys facing similar
circumstances, while members of the public are assured that attorneys
who represent them will be held to the standard of reasonable attorney
conduct under the circumstances of each case and not exclusively how
local practitioners usually have handled the matter.
John R. Skelton

139. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.

